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TO AWARD, BUT FEDERAL
COURTS CANNOT ENFORCE
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. United States
Department of Education'
I. INTRODUCTION
Legislation is usually interpreted by examining statutory language and
legislative history.2 However, the United States Supreme Court has considered
strict guidelines for interpreting statutes that potentially interfere with Eleventh
Amendment immunity rights.3 Application of these guidelines can lead to
peculiar court decisions, an example of which is provided in Tennessee
Department of Human Services v. United States Department of Education.4
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Wayne Hinton was licensed as a blind vendor by the Tennessee Department
of Human Services [hereinafter TDHS] pursuant to the Randolph-Sheppard
Vending Stand Act.' Hinton obtained two permits to operate vending machines
at two different sites at a federal nuclear power facility located in Tennessee."
The dispute in the case arose when sighted vendors began operating at one of the
1. 979 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1992).
2. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 253 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
3. Id
4. 979 F.2d 1162 [hereinafter Tenim Human Servs.].
5. Tenn. Human Servs., 929 F.2d at 1164. The purpose of the Randolph-Sheppard Vending
Stand Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 107 - 107f (1988) [hereinafter Randolph-Sheppard Act], is to provide
employment opportunities for the blind. 20 U.S.C. § 107(a). Under the Act, priority is given to blind
persons seeking employment as vendors on federal property. 20 U.S.C. § 107(b). The Secretary of
Education designates state licensing agencies and is responsible for interpreting and enforcing the Act.
20 U.S.C. §§ 107a(a)(5), 107; 34 C.F.R. §§ 395.5, 395.8 (1988).
6. Tenn Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1164.
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sites.7 Hinton claimed that the sighted vendors' stands were in direct competition
with his stand.' The TDHS asserted that the sighted vendors' stands were not on
either of Hinton's permitted sites.9 Hinton sought to recover past and future
income from the vending machines on the site as provided in the Randolph-
Sheppard Act."
After exhausting state recovery procedures, Hinton requested an arbitration
panel from the United States Secretary of Education." This request was refused
by the Secretary on the basis of sovereign immunity.' 2  Thereafter, Hinton
obtained an order from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee compelling the Secretary to convene the arbitration panel. 3
The arbitration panel found in favor of Hinton and ordered the TDHS to pay
past income, interest, and attorney's fees.' 4 The TDHS challenged the panel's
factual findings and decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee on the basis that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
award." Hinton and the United States Department of Education were named as
defendants in the case.' 6
The district court found in favor of the TDHS on the basis that the Randolph-
Sheppard Act does not contain unambiguous language of congressional intent to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.' 7 Hinton appealed
the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
7. Id
8. Id Section 107d-3(bXl) of the Randolph-Sheppard Act defines "direct competition" as:
[The existence of any vending machines or facilities operated on the same premises as
a blind vending facility except that vending machines or facilities operated in areas
serving employees the majority of whom normally do not have access to the blind
vending facility shall not be considered in direct competition with the blind vending
facility.
20 U.S.C. § 107d-3(bXl) (1988).
9. Tenn. Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1164.
10. Id See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for discussion of the Act's enforcement
provisions.
11. Tenn. Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1164. Hinton first sought an evidentiary hearing from the
TDHS. Id The state hearing officer found in favor of Hinton and awarded past and future income
from the site. Id The Commissioner of the TDHS reversed the state hearing officer's decision on the
basis that the two properties were separate. Id
12. Id
13. Hinton v. United States Dep't of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Tenn. 1988).
14. Tenn Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1164.
15. Id at 1165.
16. Id However, the Department filed a memorandum supporting the TDHS's position. Id
17. Id The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XL
2
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Circuit.' The Sixth Circuit held that the Randolph-Sheppard Act authorized
arbitration panels to award retroactive damages against state agencies, but that the
Eleventh Amendment bars subsequent enforcement in federal court since Congress





The Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act was enacted in 1936.20 The
purpose of the Act is to provide employment for the blind and to provide a means
to economic self-reliance.2 ' The Act attempts to attain these goals by giving
blind persons priority in obtaining licenses to operate vending facilities on federal
property.22 The Act requires state agencies participating in the program to agree
to several terms expressly listed in the Act." Among the terms is a requirement
that the participating state agency agree to provide dissatisfied licensees "an
opportunity for a fair hearing."24 Furthermore, if the licensees' complaints are
not thereby resolved, the state agency must "agree to submit the grievances...
to arbitration as provided in section 107d-1 of this title."25 Section 107d-l of the
Act provides that any blind licensee who is dissatisfied with the state agency's
hearing may file a complaint with the Secretary. 26 The Secretary, in turn, "shall
convene a panel to arbitrate the dispute... and the decision of such panel shall
18. Tenn. Human Seres., 979 F.2d at 1165.
19. Id. at 1165, 1170.
20. Pub. L No. 74-732, ch. 638, 49 Stat. 1559 (1936) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§
107-107f (1974)).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 107.
22. 20 U.S.C. § 107(b). The Act sets up a licensing system for the operation of vending
facilities on federal property. 20 U.S.C. §§ 107a-107b(1). "Vending facilities" is defined as
"automatic vending machines, cafeterias, snack bars, cart services, shelters, counters, and such other
appropriate auxiliary equipment" 20 U.S.C. § 107e. State agencies are responsible for issuing
vending permits. 20 U.S.C. § 107a(b). The state agencies must give preference in granting licenses
to those persons meeting the statute's definition of "blind." 20 U.S.C. § 107a(b). Income from
vending machines without licensed vendors goes to the state agency in charge of the licensing to be
used for pension plans, health insurance, paid sick leaves, and vacation time. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-3 (a),
(c). Income from vending machines in direct competition is given to the blind licensee located at the
premises. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-3(b). If a non-licensed vending machine is not in direct competition with
a blind licensee, then 50% of the income goes to the state agency. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-3(b).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 10T.
24. 20 U.S.C. § 107b(6).
25. Id.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-l(a).
1993]
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be final and binding on the parties except as otherwise provided in this
chapter."
27
B. The Eleventh Amendment
In Chisholm v. Georgia,2s the United States Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction in a debt collection suit brought by two citizens of South Carolina
against the State of Georgia. The suit was maintained under the constitutional
grant of judicial authority under Article I of the Constitution.29  The Supreme
Court held that Article Ill abrogated any sovereign immunity defense.30 The
Eleventh Amendment was soon passed to change the result reached in
Chisholm."
In Hans v. Louisiana,12 the United States Supreme Court held that a citizen
of Louisiana could not sue the State of Louisiana in federal court for failing to
repay state bonds.33 The Court reasoned that since the Eleventh Amendment
barred suits by out-of-state citizens, suits by in-state citizens must also be
barred.34
The United States Supreme Court limited the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment in Ex Parte Young. In this case, the Court allowed a federal court
to enjoin a state official from engaging in an illegal act.36 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the official was acting as an individual, and not as a state official,
27. Id. The district court in Hinton held that the statutory language of this section does not give
the Secretary discretion to convene the arbitration paneL Hinton, 700 F. Supp. at 23. The court issued
an order directing the Secretary to convene an.arbitration panel to hear Hinton's case. Id
Section 107d-2(b)(1) establishes that the panel is to be made up of one individual designated by
the state, one individual designated by the blind licensee, and one individual jointly designated by the
two other appointees to serve as chairman.
Section 107d-2(a) requires the panel to issue notice, conduct the hearing, and render its decision
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-2(a). (See Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 704-706 (1988)).
28. 2 U.S. (2 DaL) 419 (1793).
29. U.S. CONsT. art. R1 § 2, cL 1. This clause grants the federal judicial system jurisdiction
of "Controversies.. . between a State and Citizens of another State." Id.
30. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 432.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XL The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798. Id. See supra
note 17 for text of the Eleventh Amendment
32. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
33. Id at2.
34. Id at 14-15. William A. Fletcher points out that although courts cite this case for the
proposition that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal courts brought by in-state citizens
against their resident state, the Court in Hans stated that the Amendment did not require this result
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L
REV. 1033, 1039-40 (1983).
35. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
36. Id at 156.
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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since the illegal act was not authorized by the state.37 As a result of Ex Parte
Young, citizens are allowed to bring suits for prospective injunctive relief, but
cannot bring suits for damages against states in federal courts.
38
Two doctrines have been developed by the Court to provide citizens access
to federal courts in suits for damages against states.39 First, a state may waive
its Eleventh Amendment protection.4 ° Second, Congress may abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity if acting pursuant to certain enumerated
powers.4"
In Clark v. Barnard,42 the Court held that a state may waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.43 In that case, the assignees of a railroad company
demanded payment of $100,000 plus interest from a bond held by the City of
Boston payable to the State of Rhode Island." The action was brought in federal
court.43 Rhode Island voluntarily intervened to claim the fund.46 The state also
sought to have the action removed on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibited bringing the suit in federal court. 41 The Clark Court held that the
state's voluntary intervention into the suit amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' Furthermore, Eleventh Amendment immunity "is a
personal privilege which [the states] may waive at pleasure... ."49
The requirements needed to constitute a valid waiver were further defined in
Edelman v. Jordan.5" This case involved a class action suit brought against
Illinois officials responsible for administering a federal and state program to aid
the aged, blind, and disabled.5 An action seeking both retroactive benefit
payments and prospective relief was brought in federal court.5 2 The Supreme
Court refused to follow the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held
that the state had "constructively consented" to federal suit by agreeing to
participate and administer federal and state funds in accordance with federal
37. Id at 157-58. This concept is known as "[t]he Er Pale Young fiction." See Fletcher, supra
note 34, at 1041.
38. See Tenn. Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1166 (citing 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA Er AL,
CONSTrUIONAL LAW 85 (1986)).
39. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241-42.
40. See id; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
41. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
42. 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
43. Id at 447.
44. Id. at 445-46.
45. Id at 447.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id Although the state entered the suit to claim the funds, the Court noted that it also
became a defendant in the action. Id
49. Id
50. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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law.53 The Court stated that "[clonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly
associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it
here." 4 Furthermore, the Edelman Court held that in determining whether a state
has waived its Eleventh Amendment rights, "we will find waiver only where stated
by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text
as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."" The Court
stated that state participation in a federal public aid program alone is not enough
to constitute waiver."
The second way that a state may be sued in federal court by private citizens
is if Congress has abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity through
use of its Congressional powers.5 7 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer," the United States
Supreme Court held that Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity when acting pursuant to the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 59  The Court stressed that the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment "embody significant limitations on state authority. 6° The
Court stated that when Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is exercising a plenary grant of authority given in an amendment
which includes other sections limiting state authority.6 Accordingly, Congress
may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it acts to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.62
53. Id at 673.
54. Id.
55. Id (citing Murray v. Wilson Distiing Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
56. Id The Court noted that there was nothing in the statute to authorize an action against an
individuaL Id at 674. Accordingly, the Court held that the state's participation in the program was
"far short" of amounting to a waiver. Id. The Court distinguished other cases which involved statutes
that authorized suits by designated plaintiffs. Id at 671-72 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State
Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959);
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 1971) (Bright, J.,
dissenting)). The Court noted that in these cases, the issue of waiver revolved around whether the
participating state was within the designated class of defendants. Id
57. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hoasp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976).
58. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
59. Id at 456. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. The dispute involved a claim by retired male state employees that the state's retirement benefit
plan discriminated against them on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. (See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (1988)). The employees sought
retroactive retirement benefits, attorney's fees, and prospective injunctive relief. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S.
at 448.
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Guidance in determining whether Congress has abrogated a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity was given in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.63 In
that case, California argued that Congress did not abrogate its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in adopting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 64 The
plaintiff's abrogation argument was based on the Act's legislative history and
general statutory language.65 The Atascadero Court held that "Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity ... only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."'  The Court stated
that this requirement was based on the importance of the balance of power
between the states and federal government.6 The requirement was therefore
established to ensure with certainty that Congress intended to alter the usual
balance between the states and the federal government.6
C. The Split of Authorities:
The Randolph-Sheppard Act
In Delaware Department of Health and Social Services v. United States
Department of Education,69 the Third Circuit held that Delaware had waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it agreed to participatein the Vending Stand
Act program.70 The court emphasized the contractual nature of the statute that
requires participating states to agree to binding arbitration.7" The court noted that
"the term arbitration had a well-recognized meaning" at the time the binding
arbitration provision was added to the Act.72 The Third Circuit further noted that
arbitrators awarded retroactive damages "as a matter of course" under the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Uniform Arbitration Act.7 3 Since arbitration was a well-
settled legal concept when it was added to the Act, and since there was no
legislative history suggesting limitations on arbitrators' awards, there was no
ambiguity in choice of the term.
74
63. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). The suit alleged that the Atascadero State Hospital had denied the
plaintiff employment because of his physical handicaps in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Id (See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)). The plaintiff sought compensatory damages and injunctive and
declaratory relief. Atascadero, 427 U.S. at 234.
64. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.




69. 772 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1985).
70. Id at 1138.
71. Id at 1126-33. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.





Reid: Reid: Monetary Damages against States
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The Third Circuit stated that the Eleventh Amendment did not allow
Delaware to avoid its contractual agreement." The court held that Delaware had
clearly waived its Eleventh Amendment protection by agreeing to participate in the
blind vendor program.76
The Eighth Circuit reacheda different conclusion in McNabb v. United States
Department of Education." Separate opinions were written by each judge on the
three-person panel."' Judge Fagg and Judge Doty stated that the Vending Stand
Act did not authorize arbitrators to award money damages against states. 9 Chief
Judge Lay found that the Act authorized retroactive damages against states and
that the Act abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity."0
Judge Fagg maintained that states were not "adequately alert[ed]" that
arbitration panels could award monetary damages against a state due to a state's
agreement to participate in the program."' Judge Fagg noted that the Act lacked
express language regarding monetary damages, and further, that the legislative
history was silent with regard to monetary damages.' Judge Fagg disagreed with
the Delaware court's conclusion that the term "arbitration" was unambiguous."
Judge Doty concluded that Congress did not intend to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting the Vending Stand Act.' Judge
Doty asserted that Congress did not make a state's participation in the Act's
program unambiguously conditioned upon waiving its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.8 5
Chief Judge Lay maintained that the Act authorized arbitration panels to
award monetary damages and that Congress abrogated participating states'
immunity. 6 Judge Lay agreed with the Delaware court's determination that the
act clearly authorized arbitration panels to award monetary damages against
statesY
However, Judge Lay's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
monetary damage awards was based upon reasoning different from the Delaware
75. Id. at 1137-38.
76. Id. The court stated that "[t]he waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to arbitration
could hardly have been made more clearly." Id at 1138.
77. 862 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1988). It should be noted that the only issue addressed by the Eighth
Circuit was the range of damages that an arbitration panel is allowed to award under the Vending Stand
Act. Id. at 683. The court did not address whether a monetary award would be enforceable in federal
court. Id. However, Judge Lay, the author of the minority opinion, assumed that a monetary
enforcement action in federal court would violate the Eleventh Amendment Id. at 685 n.2.
78. Id. at 685.
79. Id. at 683.
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id at 686.
82. Id
83. Id (citing Delaware, supra note 69).
84. Id. at 687 (Doty, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. Id
86. Id at 684 (Lay, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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court's reasoning.88 Judge Lay maintained that Congress had abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment rights of the states participating in the blind vendor
program.8 9 Judge Lay concluded that Congress intended to abrogate the
immunity of participating states since the program required aggrieved vendors to
submit complaints to arbitration panels, and since "[t]he only parties with whom
blind vendors can have disputes... are states."°
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Tenn. Human Servs., the Sixth Circuit addressed (1) whether an arbitration
panel is authorized to award monetary damages under the Vending Stand Act; (2)
whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the arbitration panel from awarding
monetary damages; and (3) whether the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement
of monetary damages awarded by an arbitration panel.9' Judge Norris, writing
for the three-judge panel, noted statutory language of the Act that provided for
mandatory binding arbitration of vendor disputes and that required participating
states to submit unresolved vendor disputes to arbitration.9 The court stated that
a plain reading of the statute indicates that monetary disputes would be subject to
arbitration.9 3 Furthermore, the court stressed that Congress was "surely . . .
aware that arbitration panels routinely awarded retroactive relief."94 The court
therefore concluded that arbitration panels had statutory authority under the
Vending Stand Act to award monetary damages.95
The court rejected the argument of the state agency and the Department of
Education that "the Eleventh Amendment . . . appl[ies] to executive branch
adjudicatory bodies." '96 The court stated that the amendment only limits the
federal judicial branch and does not limit executive branch enforcement.' Since
the arbitration panel was convened by an executive branch agency, the Eleventh
Amendment does not place limitations on the arbitration panel.98
However, the court emphasized that a separate issue arises when an attempt
is made to collect a monetary award in federal court. 99 The court stated that the
Eleventh Amendment would not prohibit the federal government from collecting
88. Id. at 685.
89. Id. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment rights was not discussed in the opinion since Judge Lay
found Congress had abrogated the participating states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id
90. Id
91. Tenn. Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1165-67.
92. Id. at 1165.
93. Id
94. Id. (citing Delaware, supra note 69).
95. Id.
96. Id at 1166-67.
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damages from a state, even if the money "ultimately will pass to a private
person."'" The basis of this rule is that "a state implicitly surrenders its
immunity to such suits when it joins the Union." '' However, the court stated
that this rule was not applicable since the vendor, rather than the federal agency,
was seeking damages."° Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that the Eleventh
Amendment was implicated by the vendor's attempt to collect the arbitration
panel's monetary damages award. 3
The court next addressed the issues of waiver and abrogation of the state's
Eleventh Amendment rights.1°' The court stated that its search for
Congressional intent was limited to the text of the statute. 05  The court
distinguished Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co." on the basis that the statute
involved in Union Gas explicitly established liability and explicitly excluded states
as potentially liable parties in some circumstances. 7 The court maintained that
"the mere reference to binding arbitration... does not unmistakably suggest that
... a state will surrender its sovereign immunity.... [Miuch more explicit
language is required to abrogate or waive a state's sovereign immunity."'0"
Accordingly, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a private
party from enforcing an arbitration panel's award of monetary damages against a
state in federal court'0 9
V. COMMENT
The Tenn. Human Servs. court should have held that Tennessee waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by choosing to participate in the blind vendor
program. A finding of waiver would have avoided several problems inherent in
the court's decision; namely, the decision's inconsistent holding, the decision's





104. Id at 1167-68.
105. Id at 1168.
106. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
107. Tenn Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1168.
108. Id
109. Id The court claimed that the result was not inconsistent with its holding allowing
arbitration panels to award retroactive damages. Id at 1168 n.3. The court stated that "[b]oth holdings
would be consistent with a congressional view that states should submit willingly to arbitration panel
decisions or that the Department of Education should sue to enforce the rights of blind vendors." Id
The court further noted that the vendor could "collect the award if the state agency agrees to pay it or
if the federal government enforces the award on his behalf." Id at 1169 n.4. Additionally, a suit in
state court was also pointed out as being a possible alternative, notwithstanding state immunity
doctrines. Id
[Vol. 1993, No. 2
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The rules governing waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity were
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Edelman."' First, a state's
waiver can be found in the express language of a statutory program in which a
state participates."' Second, a state's waiver can be found when the
"overwhelming implication [of] the text . . . leave[s] no room for any other
reasonable construction."'1 It is the second part of the Edelman test that is
satisfied by the Randolph-Sheppard Act.
The statute's "overwhelming implication" is that participation in the program
entails being subject to potential monetary damages awards. Before participating
in the blind vendor program, states must agree to submit to binding arbitration for
disputes with vendors. " As noted by the Tenn. Human Servs. court,
"arbitration panels routinely award retroactive relief."" 4  When a state
participates in the blind vendor program and accepts the program's terms,
including binding arbitration, it consents to a dispute resolution procedure that
allows awards of monetary damages. The panel's decision is, in turn, subject to
review by federal courts.' The "overwhelming implication" of the binding
arbitration provision is that by accepting the provision's terms, the state consents
to monetary damage exposure and subsequent enforcement actions in federal court.
Accordingly, participating states should be found to have waived their Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
The court's holding in Tenn. Human Servs. is internally inconsistent in that
it allows arbitrators to award monetary damages to aggrieved vendors, but does
not allow them to enforce the award in federal court. The court held that the
Act's arbitration provision is clear enough to give arbitration panels the authority
to award monetary damages, but acceptance of this same provision by
participating states is not clear enough to constitute a valid Eleventh
Amendment waiver.
The court's contention that its holding is not inconsistent overlooks practical
considerations. First, it is unlikely that a state involved in a dispute with a vendor
will voluntarily agree to pay an unenforceable arbitration award. If a state
treasurer did this, there could be a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the
officer. Furthermore, if a state believed in its position strongly enough to take the
dispute to the arbitration process, it is not likely that it would give up and abide
by an arbitration panel's unenforceable decision.
Second, bringing a suit in state court raises additional concerns; namely, the
impartiality of the reviewing state court, non-uniform application of federal law,
and state sovereign immunity. As Justice Brennan states, the essential function of
the federal courts is "to provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform
110. 415 U.S. at 673. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
111. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
114. Tenm Human Servs., 979 F.2d a 1165 (citing Delaware, 772 F.2d at 1136-37).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-2(a) (1988).
19931
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interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the land.""' 6 Although it
is unlikely that a state court would intentionally be partial to a state agency, the
potential does exist. The potential for non-uniformity of federal law also exists
since the separate states will be deciding the cases arising under the Act.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the existence of state sovereign immunity could
leave an aggrieved vendor without an adequate remedy. The remedies existing for
an aggrieved vendor would be limited to prospective injunctive relief and an
unenforceable arbitration decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Tenn. Human Servs. is contrary to the policy behind the
Randolph-Sheppard Act. The Act was written to increase the independence of
blind persons. However, aggrieved vendors, under the Tenn. Human Servs.
holding, are left without a means of enforcing the Act's provisions. Collection of
wrongfully withheld income is left to federal officials. As is evident from the
Tenn. Human Servs. case, federal officials will not always be able (or willing) to
enforce aggrieved vendors' rights. As a result, aggrieved vendors are left without
a means of achieving the financial independence envisioned by the Act.
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